



HiPo: The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science





HiPo

The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science

Volume 5

March 2022

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All articles are anonymously student peer-reviewed and edited. Submissions from the editorial team have been reviewed by faculty. HiPo is published online annually with the support of the Department of History, Latin, and Political Science; the Dean and Division Chair of Social Sciences; Langara Communications & Marketing; and the Langara Print Shop.

ISSN 2561-6536

Submissions:
<https://langara.ca/departments/history-latin-political-science/HiPo>
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A LETTER FROM THE EDITORIAL TEAM

We are proud to present the fifth edition of *HiPo: The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science*. The process of putting this edition of the journal together has been a valuable learning experience for editors and authors alike, offering us all a glimpse into the (rather rigorous) world of academic publishing. The papers which have been selected this year cover three broad subjects: the intellectual history of Islam; the impact of war and environmental crises on modern European states and their politics; and the notion of sovereignty in modern Canada.

This is the second edition of the journal to have been put together during the global Covid-19 pandemic. Understandably, these conditions have produced new obstacles for us all—as a result, the editorial team which has come out the other side is a small one. Still, this small team has persevered and put together a journal that we can all be proud of. Of course, all that effort would have been in vain if it were not for the vital guidance and assistance provided by Dr. Michael Fulton, along with the support of the History, Latin, and Political Science Department as a whole. But most of all we must thank our contributing authors, whose hard work and scholarship have produced the papers which fill the pages of this journal.

NICK HALME, GIGI WATSON, AND DAESHA YOUNG

A LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR

One of the greatest privileges that I have as department chair is the opportunity to write an introductory letter of congratulations to the team who produce *HiPo*. This year, the team have continued to work diligently, despite the ongoing limitations of the pandemic, to produce yet another outstanding issue. Within these pages you will find excellent discussions of a wide range of topics, most of which are directly relevant to concerns that face us in today's world. As always, I would like to extend sincerest congratulations and heartfelt thanks, on behalf of both myself and the department, to the team, the contributors, and the faculty advisors who have worked so hard on this volume. As the journal reaches its five-year anniversary, we also continue to be grateful to the college administration for their ongoing support, and look forward to many more issues to come in the future.

NIALL CHRISTIE, PHD
Department Chair
History, Latin, and Political Science



SAINTS AND SKEPTICS: THE MIGRATION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY FROM EAST TO WEST IN THE MIDDLE AGES

CRISPIN WELLBURN

This paper examines the westward movement of Greek natural philosophy in the Middle Ages, assessing the documentation of many Greek philosophers in Islamic schools and their proliferation throughout the Islamic world. The paper will examine the transfer of Greek philosophy from Islam to Christendom via major thinkers from both cultures, such as Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Thomas Aquinas. The paper heavily engages with the reception of Greek philosophy from Islamic and Christian Religious leaders. Particularly, the focus will be upon the problems that natural philosophy presented for Islam's and Christianity's respective medieval religious worldviews and whether those ideological problems were resolved or remained.

During the Middle Ages, there was little knowledge of Greek philosophy in the Latin West, whereas in the Muslim world the works of many influential Greek thinkers were well documented. Much of the philosophical heritage that Western thinkers attribute to the Greeks was disseminated to western scholars by Arabic translations and commentaries of Greek works. In the Muslim world, there was an unparalleled collection of translated Greek works. However, despite its availability, teaching Greek philosophy was viewed as nearly heretical by religious leaders. In the West, while few works of Greek philosophy were readily accessible, they were standard curriculum in many universities. Philosophy became essential for the understanding of theology and was assimilated into Christian thought. The differences in reception to Greek philosophy between the two cultures can largely be attributed to their structures of education and limitations of religious authority. Despite these differences notable scholars in both regions learned from and wrote about Greek philosophy and had a measurable impact on the development of thought in both regions.

In the Muslim world, copies of Arabic translations of Greek philosophy and the natural sciences were available to scholars. Translation of these works in the Middle East began with Nestorian Christians translating the original Greek into local languages.¹ Under the Abbasid Caliphs, the House of Wisdom in Baghdad became a center of translation of Greek philosophical texts, spreading them throughout the Islamic world.² Educational institutions such as libraries held vast amounts of information, including Greek philosophy.³ Thanks to the translated works that were studied by Islamic scholars, sciences such as astronomy, mathematics and medicine were more advanced than in the Latin West.⁴ Within the educational realm of the Islamic world Greek writings on natural philosophy were abundant, but were not widely taught.⁵

To understand the relatively non-existent study of Greek philosophy in the Muslim world, particularly in its educational centers, it is vital to comprehend the structure of their houses of learning which differed greatly in structure and formation than those of the Latin West. The main schools of secular education in the Islamic world, known as madrasa, were exclusive to all foreign sciences (most schools that officially taught foreign sciences were non-existent by the twelfth century).⁶ The most respected fields of study in the Islamic world were law and theology, the field of philosophy by contrast was outright ridiculed and its teachers persecuted.⁷

A madrasa was formed under the law of the Waqf. The law pertained to the advancement of education through the founding of new madrasas, which was synonymous with advancement of religion in Islam.⁸ The law of the Waqf allowed wealthy Muslim benefactors to provide the funds for both the physical establishment and administration of new madrasas.⁹ The founder was expected to donate not just land but also the materials and lodgings needed for a madrasa.¹⁰ The Law of the Waqf gave the founder a huge amount of choice in the administration, preferred study and distribution of funds.¹¹ If Islamic law allowed benefactors the liberty of individual liberties for benefactors, why was Greek philosophy rarely

¹William E Carroll, "Creation and Science in the Middle Ages," *New Blackfriars* 88, no. 1018 (November 2007): 680.

²Carroll, 680.

³George Makdisi, *The Rise of College: Institutions of learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 25.

⁴Edward Grant, "The Fate of Ancient Greek Natural Philosophy in the Middle Ages: Islam and Western Christianity," *The Review of Metaphysics* 61, no. 3 (2008): 507.

⁵Grant, 509.

⁶Makdisi, 10.

⁷Grant, 509.

⁸Makdisi, 38.

⁹Makdisi, 35.

¹⁰Makdisi, 38.

¹¹Makdisi, 36.

taught in madrasas? Founders of madrasas were granted intellectual autonomy.¹² This essentially banned the teaching of Greek philosophy in institutions of secular learning, as benefactors were not willing to endanger personal reputation for the sake of education. As opposed to the Latin West, the church and state in Islam were not separated; a secular ruler had to always bear in mind the interests of religious leaders.

Muslim religious leaders did not hold favourable views of Greek philosophy, choosing either to ignore it or to condemn its teaching.¹³ This was primarily because Greek philosophy, especially natural philosophy, was distrusted by religious leaders who controlled the attitudes that the secular Islamic world and its schools held of foreign sciences. Perhaps the most problematic view held by Greek philosophy was that the universe is eternal, which is incompatible with Islamic teaching. William E. Carroll writes in his article, *Creation and Science in the Middle Ages*, that a concern for Muslim theologians was that God's "Divine sovereignty ... of the created order must be protected from the encroachments of Greek logic."¹⁴ The control which the religious class held over secular authority meant that Islamic schools had no feasible way to teach Greek philosophy, because it did not fundamentally accord with the tenets of Islam.

Despite these roadblocks, well-educated teachers of Greek philosophy still existed in the Muslim world, though they were both persecuted by religious leaders and ridiculed within university circles.¹⁵ The students who wished to gain an education in natural philosophy were circumstantially required to do so outside of madrasas. A private education offered the opportunity to learn the teachings of Greek philosophers that did not attract the attention of religious leaders.¹⁶ The existence of many developments in natural philosophy in the Muslim world is impressive given the high degree of persecution and resultant lack of teachers.¹⁷ This advancement is apparent in the effect that Islamic Philosophers' writings had on Western Christendom and its thinkers.

The West had a small selection of translated works by Greek philosophers and eagerly absorbed any amount it could gain access to.¹⁸ There were no significant developments in the European understanding of Greek philosophy until the commentaries of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) on Aristotle were circulated. Averroes, a Muslim philosopher from Cordoba, was harassed by the religious establishment for his views but his commentaries on Aristotle were paramount for an understanding

¹²Makdisi, 36.

¹³Grant, 508.

¹⁴Carroll, 680.

¹⁵Grant, 509.

¹⁶Grant, 514.

¹⁷Grant, 517.

¹⁸Grant, 520.

of Greek philosophy in the West.¹⁹ Averroes's impact on the Christian world is so significant that Raphael places him in his painting *The School of Athens* alongside the very philosophers Averroes' commented on.²⁰ For the Latin world, Averroes came to be seen not just as a Muslim commentator on Aristotle but as a philosopher in his own right.²¹ However, the theological problems that troubled Islamic religious leaders were still an issue for the Catholic Church. Averroes writes that "reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by those verses and hadith which are apparently contradictory. When their universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions should vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised before, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear."²² The contradictions Averroes speaks of are differences between religion and philosophy. Averroes insists that embracing reason would limit the contradictions between theology and philosophy, which also means embracing Aristotelian ideas such as the eternity of the world. The Church, like the religious institutions of the Islamic world believed in a created world and not an eternal one.²³

The Catholic Church, seeing a rising number of Averrosists at the university of Paris, requested that scholars reject his teachings.²⁴ Thomas Aquinas is the most well-known of these intellectual combatants but other scholars such as Giles of Rome also wrote against the Averrosists.²⁵ However, the church portrayed Aquinas as the singular victor over Averroes.²⁶ Aquinas argued not only on the basis of theology but of reason, using Aristotelian logic as the foundation of his arguments. Aquinas writes that "something exists which is truest, greatest, noblest, and consequently most fully in being; for, as Aristotle says, the truest things are most fully in being."²⁷ Appealing to the authority of Aristotle allows Aquinas to demonstrate that the Greek philosopher's ideas are not fundamentally wrong, only Averroes's interpretation of Greek philosophy is flawed. Despite Aquinas's questionable popularity, Pope John XXII eventually sought to canonize the scholar for his work.²⁸ The granting of a sainthood to Aquinas in honor of his victory over Averroes meant that the Church officially recognized the use of Greek philosophy in tandem with theology.

¹⁹Anthony Kenny, *Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 50.

²⁰Koert Debeuf, "Damnatio Memoriae: On Deleting the East from Western History," *New England Journal of Public Policy* 32, no. 2 (2020): 4.

²¹Kenny, 50.

²²Ibn Rushd, "Ibn Rushd on Fate and Predestination," in *Intellectual and Cultural Life, 1200-1300*, compiled by Niall Christie (Vancouver: Langara College, Spring 2021), 6.

²³Debeuf, 2.

²⁴Debeuf, 4.

²⁵Debeuf, 4.

²⁶Debeuf, 5.

²⁷Thomas Aquinas, "Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae," in *Intellectual and Cultural Life, 1200-1300*, compiled by Niall Christie (Vancouver: Langara College, Spring 2021), 3.

²⁸Kenny, 74.

The sentiments of the Church also shifted regarding the place of Greek philosophy in education but there were hindrances that limited the power of the Church in the educational realm. By the time that translations of Greek philosophy arrived in the West, universities had already distinguished themselves institutionally from Cathedral schools.²⁹ The Church attempted to ban the works of Aristotle but failed to prevent their spread;³⁰ eventually secular universities even required an understanding of Greek natural philosophy in order to attain a mastery of theology.³¹ Ultimately it would prove impossible to practice theology in the West without using logic, even if many disagreed with Aristotle's worldview.³² Aquinas himself made the distinction between faith and reason, even if he saw them as complementary rather than contradictory.³³ Most importantly there was no legal expectation that secular education adhere to the teaching of the Church; the institutional separation of Church and university meant that secular subjects could be taught without religious interference. The Church soon found that it was unable to prevent the spread and influence of Greek philosophy and held no real power over the curriculum of universities.³⁴

The spread of Greek philosophy from East to West during the Middle Ages carried with it the intellectual connotations of Islamic philosophers. Western scholars such as Aquinas refuted the previous attachments of Greek philosophy to Islam, using the logical methods inherited from the same Islamic commentators. In its reliance on philosophy, the Church permitted philosophy to become embedded into Western theology. The differing receptions of Greek philosophy in the Islamic and Christian worlds stem from not difference in religion but in institutional structures. Without the separation of church and state, practicing secular philosophy in the Islamic world proved impossible, no matter how many translations of Greek philosophy were in circulation. In the West, the separation of the Church from academic learning meant that the secular hunger for new knowledge went unchecked. This provided the necessary framework for the influence of Greek philosophy upon Catholic scholarship to flourish despite a limited number of translations and the eventual assimilation of philosophy into Christian theology.

²⁹Grant, 520.

³⁰Grant, 515.

³¹Grant, 521.

³²Grant, 522.

³³Kenny, 167.

³⁴Grant, 522-523.

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MOVING IN MYSTICAL WAYS: THE DIALECTIC OF AL-GHAZALI AND IBN RUSHD IN ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY

AMY SKY

Epistemology, or the study of how knowledge is formed, played a foundational role in early Islamic intellectual life. Medieval Muslim scholars and theologians often took opposing stances in heated debates around epistemic questions concerning the nature of knowledge, rationality, and faith. Some of these scholars were inspired by classical Greek philosophers, while others wished to denounce the actions of all philosophers as unsuitable and impious. By holding contradictory positions, two Muslim scholars – namely al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd – established a dialectic structure that can be seen as a productive framework for philosophical advancement in the Islamic world and one which became influential on many philosophers to come.

Epistemology is generally described as the theory of knowledge and, as such, can be understood as the study of how knowledge is formed, namely, what it is possible to have knowledge of and, to some extent, what knowledge is “real” or valid. In early Islamic intellectual life, epistemic exploration was equally foundational to theology and philosophy because of questions central to both: what can we know of God, where does knowledge come from, and how does a Muslim determine, with certainty, what they know. In addition, what kind of knowledge is paramount. Clearly the Quranic revelation is of singular importance, but are recorded traditions (*hadith*) or the chain of transmitters (*isnād*) to be trusted?¹ Or can rational knowledge, acquired through one’s intellectual ability, be considered a true and moral source?² These epistemic questions presented a particular thorn in the side

¹Andrew Rippin and Teresa Bernheimer, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, 5th ed. (London, New York: Routledge, 2019), 47-48.

²One *ayāh* that refers to the gift of knowledge specifically is 58:11, from the *surah al-mujadila* (which imparts many social protocols): “...Allah will raise up those of you who believe and who

of medieval Muslim thinkers and scholars, as some were inspired by classical Greek philosophers and others wished to denounce the actions of philosophers as unsuitable and impious. By holding contradictory positions, two medieval Muslim scholars – namely al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd – established a dialectic structure that can be seen as a productive framework for philosophical advancement in the Islamic world and became influential on many philosophers to come.

While classical philosophy in the Islamic world largely grew out of scholarly study and response to Aristotelian texts, named *falsafa* in Arabic, its roots are also found in original Arabic texts, such as theological works and the mystical explorations of Sufism.³ Certainly, much of the *falsafa* tradition can be traced to the cultural enrichment that took place within the empire-building expansion of Islamic conquest. As the Arab conquests expanded the Islamic world throughout the 7th to 9th centuries, settling Muslim populations in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Persia and beyond, Muslim scholars' interaction with other cultures and ideas increasingly influenced the direction of their intellectual projects and philosophical inquiry.⁴ An extensive translation movement was established in Baghdad,⁵ supported by the patronage of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn (r. 813-833).⁶ Rendering foreign texts into Arabic made accessible a library of ancient literature on diverse subjects such as mathematics, medicine, and philosophy.⁷ Muslim theology and *falsafa* was irrevocably changed by exposure to newly available works of Greek logic and philosophy, as Islamic scholars utilized the back-and-forth method of rational dialectic, termed *kalām*, to discuss theological puzzles, develop ideas, and pose questions that had gone unvoiced before now.⁸ A group of theologians named the Mu'tazila became well known for using this style of argumentation and relying on the Greek philosophical assumption that human reason is a reliable source of knowledge; this could be seen roughly as a beginning for Islamic epistemology.⁹ Certain Mu'tazilite doctrines were especially controversial and divisive, such as "the createdness" of the Qur'ān, God's "unity", as well as the primacy of human reasoning, free will, and responsibility.¹⁰ The Mu'tazilites believed that since the human faculty of reason can make moral judgements, and it would be unjust of God

have been granted (mystic) Knowledge." There are similarly numerous hadiths which credit the Prophet with extolling the benefits of seeking knowledge to Believers.

³Peter Adamson, *Philosophy in the Islamic World: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 3, no. 445.

⁴Vernon Egger, *A History of the Muslim World to 1405: The Making of a Civilization* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004), 127-128.

⁵Specifically, the translation movement was initiated by Caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 754-775) as he founded Baghdad and was continued by his son al-Mahdī (r. 775-785).

⁶Najib G. Awad, "Creatio Ex Philosophia: Kalām as Cultural Evolution and Identity-Formation Means in the Early Abbasid Era," *Muslim World* 109, no. 4 (October 2019): 510.

⁷Egger, 89, 128-129.

⁸Rippin and Bernheimer, 75.

⁹Egger, 134.

¹⁰Egger, 117; Adamson, 6-7.

to punish people for deeds they were constrained to do (and God is presumed ‘just’), human beings must be free to act either morally or immorally.¹¹ Like many Muslim scholars, Mu’tazilite philosophers (*falasifahs*) al-Fārābī (d. 950) and Ibn Sina (d. 1037) adapted Neoplatonic arguments and Aristotle’s deductive methods to suit an Islamic context, promoting human reason and empiricism as a source of objective knowledge – a major point of contention for critics.¹² One such traditionalist, al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) was a respected jurist, polymath, and Sufi thinker; he pushed back against the discipline of *falsafa* in his masterwork, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* [*Tahafat al-Falasifah*].¹³

Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazālī was born around 1058 CE in Tabarān-Tūs, Iran and studied Ash’arite theology in Nishapur, and became a celebrated scholar and teacher at the caliphal courts in Isfahan and Baghdad.¹⁴ As described in his autobiographical work, *Deliverance from Error*, al-Ghazālī left his esteemed position in Baghdad in 1095 after suffering a crisis of confidence. He became convinced his life was a “thicket of attachments” and unacceptably motivated by the desire for acclaim and “public recognition”, which led him to doubt ‘worldly’ and empirical ways of knowing.¹⁵ This reveals his deep preoccupation with moral and devotional use of knowledge; as Joseph Lumbard articulates, for al-Ghazālī “what we *do* with the knowledge [is key], the knowledge is no good unless we actually use it to better ourselves”.¹⁶ Discarding the trappings of prestige, he made pilgrimages to Damascus, Jerusalem, and Mecca seeking a “strong, intellectual faith” through the mystical-experiential knowledge he had studied in Sufi texts.¹⁷ Al-Ghazālī subsequently returned to Tūs a transformed man and opened a small Sufi lodge/school (*zawiya*) where he taught until his death in 1111 CE.¹⁸

Epistemological scepticism, i.e. questioning the means of acquiring knowledge, was a primary facet of al-Ghazālī’s theological investigations. With *Tahafat al-Falasifah*, he set out to refute the Aristotelian *falasifahs* by showing that there were natural and ascribed limits to reason. For instance, humans should not conjecture anything that might govern or curtail God’s actions and abilities, as God is

¹¹Adamson, 6.

¹²Egger, 135-136.

¹³Frank Griffel, “al-Ghazālī,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last revised September 22, 2014, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/al-ghazali/>.

¹⁴Griffel.

¹⁵Abu Hamid Al-Ghazālī, “Deliverance from Error” in *Philosophical Questions: East and West*, ed. Bina Gupta and J. N. Mohanty (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 130-31; Joseph Lumbard, “Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī and *The Art of Knowing*,” YouTube video, 34:38, June 16, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m5MS2YsqCO8>.

¹⁶Lumbard, 0:40-0:52.

¹⁷Griffel; al-Ghazālī, “Deliverance from Error,” 135.

¹⁸Griffel.

omnipotent,¹⁹ and, moral knowledge is inherent and divinely inspired, thus the most important kinds of knowledge are unattainable “by observation”.²⁰ Ultimately, al-Ghazālī meant to dismantle the philosophical systems of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sina, cast doubt on theories which opposed doctrinal religious teachings, and disillusion those who regarded the philosophers as infallible.²¹ Although al-Ghazālī expressed disgust with philosophers and their ‘superior approach’, ironically, he had no qualms using similar, rational methods to make his arguments against philosophical knowledge.²² In essence, al-Ghazālī can be read as nonpartisan: he deconstructs religious orthodoxy, criticizing theologians for their “excessive reliance on authority and tradition,”²³ while arguing that philosophy’s main fault is an illegitimate use of logic, such as its application in religious problems, considered by some theologians to be *bila kayf* (i.e., conundrums better left “without asking/ knowing how”).²⁴ Perhaps, as Albertini asserts, this is due to the epistemic tenet that knowledge is formed in an “individual mind seeking truth,” and not through quoting authoritative texts *ad infinitum* – revealing al-Ghazālī’s mystical tendencies concerning what is knowable.²⁵

Many of the major theological/ epistemological debates al-Ghazālī grappled with were picked up by subsequent Islamic philosophers, and centuries later, by Western philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, and Hume.²⁶ One vocal opponent was Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Latinized as Averroes, who sought to reconcile religious doctrines with rational, Aristotelian formulations in defense of philosophy in Islamic society.²⁷ His dialectic response to al-Ghazālī’s *Tahafat*, named *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*, tackled all of the great premises, refuting the eternal nature of the world, the divine limits of cause and effect, and a literal reading of ‘Miracle stories’ in the Qur’an.²⁸ Ibn Rushd took the stance that epistemic inquiry is advocated by the Qur’an and thus the search for knowledge, i.e.

¹⁹Adamson, 42.

²⁰Al-Ghazālī, “Deliverance from Error,” 134.

²¹Abu Hamid Al-Ghazālī, *Tahafut al-Falasifah [Incoherence of the Philosopher]*, trans. Sabih A. Kamali (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963), 8, <http://ghazali.org/works/taf-eng.pdf>; Avital Wohlman and David B. Burrell, *Al-Ghazālī, Averroës and the Interpretation of the Qur’an: Common Sense and Philosophy in Islam* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 23.

²²Egger, 204.

²³Tamara Albertini, “Crisis and Certainty of Knowledge in Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) and Descartes (1596-1650),” *Philosophy East and West* 55, no. 1 (January 2005), 3.

²⁴Oliver Leaman, *Islamic Philosophy: An Introduction* (Oxford: Wiley, 2013), 24.

²⁵Albertini, 3.

²⁶Edward O. Moad, “Al-Ghazālī on Power, Causation, and ‘Acquisition,’” *Philosophy East and West* 57, no. 1 (January 2007): 8; Edward O. Moad, “Between Divine Simplicity and the Eternity of the World: Ghazālī on the Necessity of the Necessary Existent in the Incoherence of the Philosophers,” *Philosophy and Theology* 27, no. 1 (2015): 55.

²⁷Egger, 203.

²⁸Leaman, 31-45; Isra Yazicioglu, “Redefining the Miraculous: Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd and Said Nursi on Qur’anic Miracle Stories,” *Journal of Qur’anic Studies* 13, no. 2 (October 2011): 92.

philosophy, should be a Muslim duty; whether a person attained specialized knowledge would be determined by their God-given abilities.²⁹

Both, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, wrote in response to predecessors adding unique perspectives on theological and epistemic questions and provided a fruitful legacy for dialectical discussion. These remarkable minds were frequently using the same tools to come to different conclusions, as they worked through fundamental yet esoteric problems. Ibn Rushd saw the intellect, and thus philosophy, as a divine gift sanctioned for thoughtful, deductive processes. Al-Ghazālī felt that acquiring (mystical) knowledge happened through mysterious means: God was sole author of the “light cast into his heart,” curing and dispelling intellectual doubt within him.³⁰ Rather than truly being at cross-purposes, these keen intellects transmuted their opposition and disagreement into fertile and common ground.

²⁹Adamson, 39.

³⁰Adamson, 42. In al-Ghazālī’s own words: “At length God cured me of the malady; my being was restored to health and an even balance; the necessary truths of the intellect became once more accepted, as I regained confidence in their certain and trustworthy character. This did not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, but by a light which God most high cast into my breast.” Al-Ghazālī, “Deliverance from Error,” 3.

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THE FLOATING MAN AND THE METHODOLOGICAL GROUNDS FOR AVICENNA’S IMMATERIAL SOUL

NICK HALME

While Avicenna is traditionally perceived as advocating for the human soul’s immaterial nature, his “floating man” thought experiment has been seen to offer an apparently circular argument. This paper investigates Avicenna’s methodology in order to contextualize this thought experiment and determine its meaning within Avicenna’s philosophical system. The paper examines how Avicenna’s conception of thought experiments and the nature of the soul were influenced by his reception of Aristotle through the lens of Neoplatonist commentators. The paper then proposes that this Neoplatonist reception of Aristotle led Avicenna to conceive of the material and immaterial as logically identical and sharing the attribute of existence. This paper finds that Avicenna did not conceive of his “floating man” argument as circular. Rather, Avicenna intended to show that an empirical test of the immateriality of the soul was possible, providing evidence for his view that the soul could come into contact with another such immaterial existent: God.

In Avicenna’s *Autobiography*, he informs the reader that he mastered the Qur’ān by the age of ten, and that he quickly mastered the least difficult science: medicine.¹ What Avicenna hopes to make clear, besides his confidence, is his view that these things are not the epitome of the “sciences”—the highest knowledge (*al-‘ilm*) being occupied by philosophy.² However, Avicenna had learned from al-Fārābī’s work that philosophy could not examine the nature of God, contra al-Kindī, and so he believed that he would have to instead examine the nature of existence in general.³ Avicenna’s philosophy led him to find that the nature of the human soul was not identical with the material of the body, but was immaterial, and he constructed the

¹Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 180.

²Gutas, 178-179.

³Peter Adamson, “Al-Kindī and the Reception of Greek Philosophy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, eds. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 34.

“Floating Man” thought experiment to illustrate his argument. This paper will argue that Avicenna’s “Floating Man” thought experiment is an intentionally circular argument, which illuminates the empirical commitments of Avicenna’s “rationalism.” The paper will first examine Avicenna’s understanding of thought experiments and introduce the “Floating Man.” Next, the paper will discuss Avicenna’s Neoplatonist reception of Aristotle. Finally, the paper will discuss the way in which the circularity of the “Floating Man” is complementary to Avicenna’s conceptions of “psychology” and the nature of the soul.

The concept of a thought experiment entered the Muslim world through Aristotle, such that Aristotle’s use of the Greek term for supposition (*hupekeito*) in the *Physics* is mirrored in the Arabic *farḍ*.⁴ For Avicenna it was problematic that this exercise in imagination (*fanṭāsiyā*) was not constrained so as to ensure such an experiment usefully reflected what was possible in the world.⁵ Although Avicenna inherits from Aristotle a distaste for the Platonic theory of forms, he constructs something similar in order to place limits on the imagination.⁶ Avicenna posits an “estimative faculty” he calls *wahm* with which the mind extracts intentions and, although this faculty is used to examine mathematical objects in the mind, this same faculty is used to surmise that a wolf is dangerous because of its intimidating features.⁷ It is striking that Avicenna seeks to limit the imagination with a cognitive faculty which is also used, without modification, to “estimate” intentions in the empirical realm of experience.

The general argument of the “Floating Man” is as follows: the reader is asked to imagine a man who snaps into existence in a void—he is not falling or flying, in fact he is not in contact with the air at all.⁸ His fingers do not touch one another, nor do his limbs, and he cannot see the world around him. Avicenna then has the man assess whether his self exists—despite having no knowledge of his own body or the external world. Despite his predicament, the man is completely sure that his self, or *dhāt*, is the only thing the man can detect.⁹ Thus, Avicenna appears to have produced an argument for an immaterial soul which does not require the body—the implication being that the soul is the sort of thing which could survive the death of the body.

Marmura considers that Avicenna has committed an error of circular reasoning: to accept the success of the man’s sensing of his self, one must already accept the

⁴Jon McGinnis, “Experimental Thoughts on Thought Experiments in Medieval Islam,” *The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments*, eds. Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige and James Robert Brown (London: Routledge, 2017), 78.

⁵McGinnis, “Experimental Thoughts,” 79.

⁶Gutas, 324.

⁷McGinnis, “Experimental Thoughts,” 79-80.

⁸McGinnis, “Experimental Thoughts,” 80-81.

⁹McGinnis, “Experimental Thoughts,” 81.

conditions required for it to be sensed.¹⁰ When the man considers the absence of knowledge of his heart or brain as being material sources of the soul, Avicenna is insisting that the soul to be detected must be immaterial—for a material soul could not be detected. Marmura argues that Avicenna’s circular reasoning takes the form of a category mistake: the man’s knowledge of his self—his epistemological state—is evidence for the man’s ontological state: whether his soul is material or immaterial rests on what the man knows. If the man does not detect that his brain or heart are his soul, then they must not be.¹¹ As Marmura notes, Avicenna elsewhere presents arguments to establish the nature of the soul—but the “Floating Man” is not a good argument. However, there is reason to think that Avicenna did not, in his view, produce an error.

The works of Aristotle with which Avicenna was familiar were, unbeknownst to him, the product of the “Ammonian synthesis,” the work of a Neoplatonist tradition of commentators on Aristotle beginning with the eponymous Ammonius in the late fifth century.¹² These commentators had sought to reconcile Aristotle’s conception of the soul with a Neoplatonist metaphysics—the belief in an immaterial “formal” realm which permitted the soul to transcend its residence in the body. Aristotle had conceived of the soul as *entelekheia*, or “actuality.” Given Aristotle’s theory of causation, which designates four types, this suggested that the soul was a formal cause: the soul “animates” the body—and a material cause: the soul is immanent in the body.¹³ To account for Aristotle’s application elsewhere of *entelekheia* for “change,” the Ammonians used the term *teleiotes* or “endedness” to encompass both usages, which changed Aristotle’s meaning: the soul was now the final cause or *telos* of the body.¹⁴ Aristotle’s formal, material cause was now an efficient and final cause: the soul produced change in and imparted change to the body. For the Ammonians this was a relief, as the soul was not the sort of causative agent that had to remain in the body: it had created the body, and so had existed previously without it. With this Ammonian influence in mind, Avicenna found it inconceivable that the soul could be immanent in material, such as an organ.

In *On the Rational Soul*, Avicenna is explicit about the independence of the “rational soul” and its transcendence of the body after death. Once a soul has been separated from the body and has been “purified through knowledge of God,” it becomes “like a polished mirror upon which are reflected the forms of things as

¹⁰Michael Marmura, “Avicenna’s ‘Flying Man’ in Context,” *Monist* 69, no. 3 (1986): 387-388.

¹¹Marmura, 388, 392-393.

¹²Robert Wisnovsky. “Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition,” *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, eds. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 96-97.

¹³Andrea Falcon, “Aristotle on Causality,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, January 11, 2006, revised March 7, 2019, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/>.

¹⁴Wisnovsky, 99-101.

they are in themselves.”¹⁵ For Avicenna, the key element of human psychology is the intellect—that same part of the soul in which the “estimative faculty” resides.¹⁶ The intellect contains several parts, but the most vital function is the ability to conceive of *al-‘ilm*—to hold knowledge.¹⁷ The process of obtaining knowledge requires the intellect to extract from the material world universal concepts. Immaterial knowledge is necessarily extracted from material and deposited in the immaterial soul.

Avicenna took al-Fārābī to have meant that God was not the sort of thing that could be understood, but not that the nature of God could not be investigated.¹⁸ God is one of the immaterial things which exists; what is problematic is inquiry into His nature. Avicenna’s explanation of the problem presented by the investigation of God’s nature is an appeal to Aristotle’s defence of inductive logic in the *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁹ Avicenna follows Aristotle in assuming that an inductive syllogism must proceed from axioms which cannot be understood. For there could be no acquisition of knowledge if the premises of all arguments were indeed false—the result would be an infinite regress: circular reasoning.²⁰ Aristotle simply held that not all knowledge could be demonstrated. Avicenna concurs—but notes that God is the creator of all matter and all forms, and as such is like an axiom from which all knowledge proceeds.²¹ Gutas holds that Avicenna came to believe that the world possessed the same ontological schema as the syllogism—and so a practiced mind could come into contact immediately with knowledge, without having to “extract” it.²² The Prophet is offered as an example of someone who had achieved such a level of “intellection.”²³ God, the creator of all knowledge, is something that must be “contacted,” rather than understood.²⁴ As Avicenna says in his argument for the existence of God: “no doubt, there is existence.”²⁵

For Avicenna the self, or *dhāt*, is not an object—it is not the soul—it is rather the effect of all the parts of the soul in action together.²⁶ This is why the “Floating Man” is sure that he has detected his self: if the heart or brain were the soul, then the self would be in “contact” with it. If all that a soul required was a body, it is not clear to

¹⁵Gutas, 289-290.

¹⁶McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 123-124.

¹⁷McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 117-118.

¹⁸McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 35, 150-151; Gutas, 275, 285-286, 290.

¹⁹McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 45-48.

²⁰Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 113-114.

²¹McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 150.

²²Gutas, 372.

²³Gutas, 369-372.

²⁴Gutas, 377.

²⁵Gutas, 376.

²⁶McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 142-143.

Avicenna why all bodies—all material things—are not animated and alive.²⁷ Avicenna’s circular argument is an illustration: the immaterial and the material both exist, and thus share the same ontological map. Everything which exists is subject to rational inquiry, except the “axiomatic” Creator. The “Floating Man” is not just a demonstration which takes place in the imagination; it is an empirical experiment which demonstrates Avicenna’s philosophical system in a snap. Perhaps this explains his confidence.

²⁷McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 143.

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“FREEDOM” OF THE PRESS: BRITISH PROPAGANDA AND SYSTEMS OF SELF-CENSORSHIP IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

TOR J. HERMANSEN

During the First World War the British Parliament developed a propaganda apparatus which relied heavily on the burgeoning press industry, centralized under the ownership of a small number of wealthy men, to control the public narrative surrounding the war. This essay will contextualize the foundation of the state-press partnership and the role the press played in the control of public opinion during the war. Additionally, using two specific elements of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, it will show that the complacency of the press in producing and reproducing state propaganda during World War I was a result of self-censorship systems fundamentally built into the news media industry.

None of the heroes prepared for suffering and sacrifice, none of the common herd ready for service and obedience, will be inclined to listen to the call of their country once they discover the polluted sources from whence that call proceeds and recognize the monstrous finger of falsehood which beckons them to the battlefield.

- Arthur Ponsonby, MP, *Falsehood in Wartime*

Over the course of the First World War, the British Parliament rushed to develop a propaganda apparatus to sway public opinion about the war. This apparatus relied heavily on the press industry, which had been largely centralized under the ownership of a few wealthy “press lords,” to control and manipulate the information available to the public.¹ This essay will provide context for the foundation of the state-press partnership, the role the press played in the control of public opinion during the war and, by using two specific elements of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, show that the complacency of the press in producing and

¹Alice Goldfarb Marquis, “Words as Weapons,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (1978): 473.

reproducing state propaganda during World War I was a result of self-censorship systems fundamentally built into the news media industry.

Widespread news press emerged in England with the rise of mass literacy in the nineteenth century. The initial relatively low cost of self-publishing led to the growth of independent newspapers by the mid-1800s; many of these smaller papers were politically radical and offered alternatives to the dominant ideology of the major press outlets. Parliament found this rise of a radical press among the working class threatening, with one member of parliament (MP) stating that these alternative newspapers encouraged workers to analyze their conditions and criticize the “immutable laws” of society.² The state attempted to litigate these types of independent daily papers out of existence with prosecution under new libel laws and increased taxation, but these measures had a marginal effect on independent publishers. Eventually, Parliament turned to the “free market” to regulate dissenting papers through increases in production costs, associated with the further industrialization of printing technology, and the creation of joint stock companies which bought up smaller papers.³ In the early years of the twentieth century this corporatization of the press was already evident to many, including former journalist and MP Hilaire Belloc, who warned that the rapid commercialization of the press could cause free journalism to be crushed under the boot of advertising companies and a small, centralized group of wealthy shareholders.⁴ These fears were proven to be justified as the ever-increasing capital required to start or buy press companies created an insular class of wealthy newspaper proprietors. This centralization was exemplified by the Harmsworth brothers; Harold Harmsworth (who was later gifted the title of Lord Rothermere) owned five major newspapers in the UK, and his brother, Alfred Harmsworth (later Lord Northcliffe), founded the *Daily Mail*, owned and edited *The Times*, and controlled a number of other papers under his stock company Associated Newspapers Limited.⁵ Other prominent figures included George Riddell, managing director of the *News of the World* and deputy chair of the Newspaper Proprietors Association, the Ontario born Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook), owner of the highly popular *Daily Express*, and C.P. Scott, owner and editor of the *Manchester Guardian*. These press lords grew wealthier as newspaper circulation rapidly increased. By the beginning of the war, Northcliffe’s daily papers alone had combined circulation numbers of approximately 1,700,000.⁶ At the same time, Parliament was interested in the growing idea that public perceptions and thinking could be manipulated through the newspapers due to the rising readership caused by a demand for information on

²Quoted in Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: Bodley Head, 2008), 63.

³Herman and Chomsky, 63.

⁴John M. McEwen, “The National Press during the First World War: Ownership and Circulation,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 3 (1982): 478.

⁵Marquis, 468; McEwen, 478.

⁶McEwen, 471.

the war, and the highly centralized nature of the wire-service news sources that disseminated information among the numerous smaller newspapers.⁷

Before the outbreak of the war in July of 1914, the German government had already begun to employ the nation's press outlets in the creation of official propaganda, in large part due to the history of state management of the press under the government of Otto Von Bismarck and Wilhelm II.⁸ Under direct control of the state, the German press mass produced written propaganda to discredit their enemies, justify their entrance into the war, and more importantly, make attempts to influence the United States.⁹ Meanwhile, in England, the press opinions were confused and often conflicting at the onset of the war, with many papers criticizing other nations for joining the conflict and outright opposing Britain's participation. It was not until the start of the German invasion of Belgium in August 1914 and Britain's subsequent official entry into the war that major press outlets slowly began to support the war effort wholeheartedly.¹⁰ In September 1914, the Parliamentary War Aims Committee concluded that immediate action must be taken to oppose Germany's propaganda campaign and that the creation of a department to organize local and foreign propaganda production was necessary. Parliament set up multiple departments and organizations to manage its propaganda effort, the first being the highly improvised Press Bureau. George Riddell was appointed as a liaison between the Bureau, the War Office and editors of the major newspapers. Riddell, who was close friends with many politicians, including Chancellor of the Exchequer David George Lloyd, used these friendly relationships to gain information which he would pass on to his conference of editors to be published.¹¹ At the same time, Parliament invited Liberal cabinet member Charles F. G. Masterman, head of the National Insurance Commission, to lead an organization that would establish the methodology of Britain's official propaganda campaign. Masterman called together a group of well-known British authors and academics to form an organization that was colloquially known as Wellington House, named for the apartment block that served as its headquarters.¹² This war propaganda organization operated for two years in total secrecy, producing pamphlets and books initially for distribution in allied and neutral foreign countries and eventually among the British populace. By the time Lloyd George assumed the prime minister's office in late 1916, Riddell's liaison position, Wellington House, and many smaller propaganda organizations in other government departments were incorporated under the direct control of the Foreign Office. Masterman's secretive propaganda organization was re-structured and renamed as the Department of

⁷Marquis, 468.

⁸Marquis, 469.

⁹M. L. Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War," *The Historical Journal* 18, no. 1 (1975): 119.

¹⁰Marquis, 469.

¹¹Marquis, 472-473.

¹²Sanders, 119.

Information, with new sections assuming responsibility for film propaganda, wireless transmissions, and state-sponsored press articles, while Masterman continued his work producing propaganda books, pamphlets, and eventually photographs.¹³ Under the leadership of John Buchan, the Department of Information fully assumed Riddell's role as the intermediary between the state and the press but retained him on its "advisory committee". This committee was composed of several other wealthy newspaper proprietors including Beaverbrook, C.P. Scott and Lord Northcliffe. The Foreign Office appointed a number of the committee members to positions within the propaganda apparatus in February 1918; Northcliffe was made director of enemy propaganda while Beaverbrook was given the title Minister of Information and tasked with organizing the new Ministry of Information. The appointments of these press lords to powerful positions within the propaganda apparatus were criticized by some in Parliament as an affront to press integrity. In the words of Austen Chamberlain, "the press loses its freedom, and with its freedom, loses its authority."¹⁴

Despite the outrage in Parliament, these appointments merely reinforced the existing relationship between the state and the press that had been utilized throughout the war. This so-called "loss of authority" among the press was obvious years before the creation of the Ministry of Information. From the onset of the war many of the major press outlets engaged in two key forms of propaganda: omission and misinformation. Many significant losses, such as the sinking of the battleship *Audacious* in 1914, were simply never reported by the press. Likewise, multiple instances of military mistakes were also not published. C.P. Scott, who had previously written letters and articles opposing Britain's involvement in the war, refused to print a letter from an English corporal detailing incidents of British soldiers accidentally shelling their own men which resulted in casualties and loss of territory, as he believed it was "too damaging for publication".¹⁵ This pattern of strategic suppression of information through the press served to quell anxieties and bolster support for the military within the general public.¹⁶ Throughout the course of the war, the British press also published stories of great crimes against humanity allegedly committed by enemy forces; many such stories originated from claims made by single witnesses and were accepted as comprehensive proof.¹⁷ One persistent claim perpetuated by the British press was the popular narrative of the German "Corpse Factories."¹⁸ First published in Northcliffe's *The Times* in April 1917, the narrative consisted of claims that the German government was using factories across its territories to process the bodies of soldiers into useful resources.

¹³Sanders, 124.

¹⁴Marquis, 473-480.

¹⁵Quoted in Marquis, 477.

¹⁶Marquis, 477-478.

¹⁷Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War-Time, Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated throughout the Nations during the Great War* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928), 75.

¹⁸Ponsonby, 57.

The details often varied, with some stories claiming the corpses were ground into livestock feed and others reporting that they were melted down into glycerin for use in munitions.¹⁹ This claim apparently originated in an article published in a Berlin daily newspaper that mentioned a “Kadaververwertungsanstalt,” which *The Times* had translated to “Corpse Exploitation Factory.”²⁰ Some in the British Parliament were critical of the translation of the word “kadaver” as it could also be used for the bodies of animals.²¹ *The Times* defended its translation of the article and published further articles on the topic. When the use of this claim for official propaganda purposes was brought in front of Parliament, the cabinet members refused to either endorse or deny the claim, although some acknowledged the lack of substantial evidence surrounding it. Nevertheless, *The Times* and other papers continued to propagate the narrative even years after the war, until it was finally publicly discredited by Austen Chamberlain in 1925. This example of atrocity propaganda and others like it served to further vilify the Germans both in England and abroad. The “Corpse Factory” narrative was widely published in both American and Asian press outlets to generate hatred towards the German state among the public and garner support for the allies within neutral countries.²² The reproduction of these narratives, while often implicitly or explicitly supported by the government, was not forced upon the press through official censorship and legislation, yet was still willingly engaged in by almost every major daily publication.

In late 1915, Home Secretary John Simon met with Riddell to discuss new censorship legislation. Simon’s proposed mandate would give Parliament the power to suspend any newspapers it considered to be violating the recently passed Defense of the Realm Act. Riddell was alarmed by this potential threat to his businesses and rallied the Newspaper Proprietors Association to pressure the Home Office into dropping the proposed legislation. Subsequent attempts by Parliament and the War Office to exert legislative control over the press also failed.²³ This raises the question as to why nearly all the major papers, which ostensibly had a duty to the British public to publish accurate information regarding the course of the war, chose instead to willingly engage in this suppression of information and production of propaganda, despite the lack of policy mandating they do so. One potential answer can be found by employing the first two “filters”²⁴ of Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model to contextualize the circumstances of the press during this period. Although Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is based primarily on events from the 1960s to present, the analysis that helped define their

¹⁹Ponsonby, 58

²⁰Quoted in Ponsonby, 57.

²¹Quoted in Ponsonby, 59.

²²Ponsonby, 57-64.

²³Marquis, 477.

²⁴Herman and Chomsky, 62.

first two filters specifically identifies power structures that came into being within the press industry of the early twentieth century.²⁵

The previously established centralization of a majority of press ownership in the hands of a few owners and stock company shareholders, as well as the close political and social relationships they had with the state, serve as evidence for the existence of this first filter of self-censorship within the press at the time. Proprietors and shareholders such as Northcliffe, Riddell, and Beaverbrook had significant power over the editors and journalists of their respective papers, and thus the positions of entire newspapers could be swayed by the personal ideologies of a few individuals. These press moguls, and certain journalists, were given land, titles, and social standings in exchange for complying with official propaganda narratives. Even before the war, membership in at least one of London's many prestigious gentlemen's clubs was necessary for the success of any newspaper proprietor. These clubs also included high ranking political and military officials, who could easily revoke the membership of any news editor or owner who allowed the publishing of stories or information that ran counter to the state's narrative of the war.²⁶ Additionally, the press companies and their owners depended on Parliament not only for direct social and political gain but also for more general policy support. Like any other large business, the proprietors of the newspapers would not want to risk Parliament making changes to tax or labor laws in retaliation for not keeping in line with official propaganda. These political and profit-oriented restraints, which are intrinsic to any company with power and capital to the degree of the press companies, acted as the first filter that affected the press companies in choosing what to publish.²⁷

The second filter of self-censorship was also present before the outbreak of the war and is a fundamental element of news media to this day. The rapid growth of the major newspaper corporations in the early twentieth century was assisted in large part by the rising popularity of printed advertisements. Papers that could attract advertisers could offset the rising production costs and charge consumers less, while papers that were deemed unattractive for advertisers could not, and as such, many papers failed as a result. Therefore, Britain's free market of the press was beholden to the influence of advertisers, in addition to the press moguls and stock companies.²⁸ The outbreak of the war led to powerful new opportunities for advertising companies. Advertising for everything from soap to firearms took advantage of slogans, stereotypes, and atrocity stories perpetuated throughout the war. By using these tactics to market to both civilians and the soldiers on the front

²⁵Herman and Chomsky, 63, 74.

²⁶Marquis, 478; McEwen, 477.

²⁷Herman and Chomsky, 73.

²⁸Herman and Chomsky, 74.

lines, profits surged with little to no restrictions from the state.²⁹ The press was effectively coerced into furthering these narratives to keep reader engagement high and maintain a profitable environment for advertisers or risk losing their primary source of income. Thus, advertiser interest acted as this second filter of self-censorship.

Both filters worked interconnectedly to restrict the press while still maintaining the illusion of free journalism. Many of the editors and journalists that operated under these systems did so with integrity and the belief that their work was objective; but these systems of self-censorship were so entrenched within the press industry that to most at the time, any alternative perspective was considered ridiculous.³⁰

For years after the First World War, much public criticism arose around the use of propaganda by both Britain and Germany. In 1929, Baron Arthur A.W.H. Ponsonby, an MP and vocal anti-war activist, published a book detailing many of the lies and propaganda tactics used by both the press and government in England. Ponsonby argues that the widespread use of misinformation especially within the press would lead to distrust among the public; on this he writes “with a warning before them, the common people may be more on their guard when the war cloud next appears on the horizon and less disposed to accept as truth the rumors, explanations, and pronouncements issued for their consumption.”³¹ Yet those who financially benefited from the British propaganda system during the war praised its use; Northcliffe wrote in *The Times* that he believed the propaganda effort had potentially saved the country from another year of war.³²

Regardless of the ethics or effectiveness of British propaganda during the First World War, there is little debate on the key role the “free” press played in its proliferation. Through the close partnerships between the state and the centralized news companies, a relatively coherent, one sided and pervasive narrative of the First World War was manufactured. This narrative was maintained through ingrained systems of self-censorship that arose from fundamental elements of the capitalist press industry, primarily centralized corporate ownership and the power of advertisers. One hundred and three years later, through the advent of TV news networks and online news media, these systems have grown exponentially and further intensified the contradictions within them.

²⁹Simon Armstrong, “WW1: How Firms Cashed in on the War,” *BBC News Magazine*, December 10, 2014, 1-4.

³⁰Herman and Chomsky, 62.

³¹Ponsonby, 2.

³²Marquis, 493.

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GERMAN YOUTH IN THE PURGATORY OF NAZI BONDAGE

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This essay discusses the means of bonding and exploitation employed by the National Socialist (Nazi) movement to achieve the extreme ethnic national devotion of young Germans. The discourse includes aspects of youth consciousness prior to, during, and after Hitler's rise to power within political, economic, cultural and ideological frameworks. The results indicate that Nazi influence capitalized on youth perceptions of society during the rapid rise of modernity, the ramifications of the post-WWI political arena, and the subsequent waves of destabilizing economic phenomena. Central to Hitler's control was a systematic employment of manipulation and propaganda. By tapping into and distorting youth psychology, the cult-like power of the Nazis permeated the thoughts and actions of millions of Germans. Disturbing echoes of such mind control are reflected in a contemporary problem whereby unbridled strategies of privileged forces possess unparalleled access and ability to again threaten individual liberty at a grand scale.

In a country with a complex intellectual and political history, youthful dreams of a utopian modernity died in World War One (WWI) and birthed an era of epic tragedy for Germany.¹ What was a relatively newly united and highly productive nation had fractured under the turbulence of defeat and subsequent crises. In a collective trauma, this European culture repudiated Enlightenment ideals of individuality, reason, and equality.² Regressively, the populous fell prey to ideals reminiscent of a glorious past and the promise of a utopian future. A freely elected Nationalist Socialist German Workers' Party, the Nazi Party, presented a morphed ideology of cultural tribalism, biology, and economy that consolidated control over

¹H. W. Koch, *The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development 1922-1945* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 2.

²Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 331.

the government, the corporate, and the personal in an authoritarian unity.³ While Germany's youth, yearning for renewed identity and purpose, were enveloped in the deceptive danger of the Nazis, the enlightened culture, famous for its poets, philosophers, composers, and scientists devolved into unprecedented brutality.⁴ The command of the Nazi leader, Adolf Hitler, over German youth culture was not just a by-product of an overall domination of Germany, but a purposeful and systematic indoctrination of political, economic, cultural and ideological bonds designed to secure and perpetuate control.

The political perspectives of German youth groups that led up to and followed WWI are salient in relation to the dynamics of Hitler's control. A strong tradition of youth movements in Germany can be traced back to the sixteenth century. Connected through shared language and culture, a concept referred to as *Volksgeist*, in 1801, by German philosopher, Hegel, groups bonded in a melding of the spirit of the individual and the regional culture.⁵ This romantic collective spirit was expressed by movements and in protests amidst the bloody revolutions before unification in 1871.⁶ As unified Germany became enveloped within the driving engine of modernity, youth movement sentiment irrationally clung to a glorified past and recoiled against rapid materialism and mass industrialization. Alienation towards the burgeoning bourgeois culture compounded with utter disillusionment in the unexpected chaos of the Great War. The perilous outcome triggered alarming unrest. Along with the destruction of war, a chain of uninterrupted political unions, splits, and reunions, disintegrated German stability.⁷ Youth insecurity and political discontent amidst the damage and humiliation of the war escalated as the German Weimar democracy flailed.⁸

Capitalizing on the political chaos, Adolf Hitler designed a campaign that delivered a vague and blurred vision of German unity and wooed and flattered the desperate, receptive, naive, and sentimental youth culture.⁹ After a failed attempt to usurp political power by brute force in 1923, Hitler, while imprisoned, premeditated new tactics to gain political control. Outlined in an autobiographical manifesto, *Mein Kampf*, these methods included emotional appeal, propaganda, and the power of

³Leonard Kreiger, "Authority," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 159.

⁴John Passmore, "The Perfectibility of Man," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 475; Koch, 2

⁵Nathan Rotenstreich, "Volksgeist," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 4 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 492; Koch, 3, 10.

⁶Koch, 15.

⁷Michael H. Kater, *Hitler Youth* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 8-9.

⁸Kohn, 324.

⁹Kater, 1.

speech.¹⁰ Trumpeting a nostalgic vision of Germany restored to a great power, Hitler appealed to youth group sentiment with claims that reassured Germany would again rightfully dominate a confederation of European states.¹¹ He forcefully echoed the younger generation's distrust of the democratic example set forth by the Weimar Republic. Hitler's Nazi alternative offered a renewed sense of German identity, pride, and respectability that attracted youth membership.¹² Young males born ineligible for WWI conscription (1900-1908) were inculcated with the glory of the war as children and, therefore, particularly malleable to persuasions to join Nazi paramilitary organizations.¹³ As the harsh defeat of the war had hungover many youth like dark shadows, Hitler's emotive campaign drove primitive base instincts to become dangerous.¹⁴ The Nazi anti-modernist youth movement became increasingly martial, hierarchal, disciplined, fully uniformed, and racist.¹⁵ While under twenty and too young to vote, these individuals were highly valued as a motivated force on the streets. A 1932 Nazi propaganda leaflet reads:

Fellow youths. We shall overthrow the old system. We are not begging for your votes in the *Reichstag* election, what we want is you. The German revolution begins on the day of the National Socialist seizure of power. Then the young forces from all camps must be united to face the forces of reaction. Our banners do not carry the slogans of 'Moscow' or 'Internationalism' or 'Pacifism.' The only name they carry is that of 'Germany' and nothing but 'Germany.' With your banners flying, come to us, the German Workers' Youth, fight with us against the old system, against the old order, against the old generation. We are the last fighters for liberty, fight with us for Socialism, for freedom and for bread! Join the German Workers' Youth, Keil.¹⁶

By 1933, democracy in Germany was lost to the authoritarian grasp of the Nazi regime. By building a political stronghold amongst the young, Hitler aimed to secure a Nazi future.¹⁷

Once in power, the Nazi regime imposed systematic and proliferate political dominance over youth culture across Germany. In Berlin, on the eve of Nazi victory

¹⁰Thomas Vordermayer, "Tactical Guidelines in Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*," *European State Violence in the Twentieth Century* 91, no. 3 (September 2019): 531; K. J. Leyser et al., "Germany," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, October 27, 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany>.

¹¹C. W. Guillebaud, "Hitler's New Economic Order for Europe," *The Economic Journal*, 50, no. 200 (1940): 452-453.

¹²Peter N. Stearns, "Protest Movements," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 674.

¹³Andrew Donson, "Why Did German Youth Become Fascists? Nationalist Males Born 1900-1908 in War and Revolution," *Social History* 31, no. 3 (2006): 337.

¹⁴Melita Maschmann, *Account Rendered: A Dossier on My Former Self* (New York: Abelard-Schuman Limited, 1965), 58; Vordermayer, 531.

¹⁵Kater, 9.

¹⁶Koch, 86.

¹⁷Edward J. Kunzer, "The Youth of Nazi Germany," *The Journal of Educational Sociology* 11, no. 6 (1938): 342.

on January 30, 1933, songs, simultaneously aggressive and sentimental, were sung by rows of boys and girls in a ceremonial torchlight procession. Infused with purpose and importance, the younger generations reveled in the revolutionary ethos of Nazism. This spirit of protest resonated with the youth and was reflected in the rapid expansion of the Hitler Youth Group (*Hitlerjugend* or HJ).¹⁸ Claiming this revolutionary guise, Hitler justified arbitrary legislation with an irreverence to law.¹⁹ Within the first year of Nazi control, all other youth groups became illegal. Disbandment was enforced by Nazi militia, SA Stormtroopers, who went door to door collecting verboten uniforms.²⁰ As recruiters and guarantors of Nazi longevity, the HJ disrupted all other loyalties; anyone astray from Nazi convictions presented an endangerment of Germany.²¹ By 1936, HJ membership became mandatory for minors between ten and seventeen years old.²² Nazism systematically indoctrinated millions of children born between 1915 and 1934.

The curriculum in school primers mandated Germanic lore, Nazi ideology, and the ‘Führer cult.’²³ Nazi classical ideals of stability, order, uniformity, and work ethic imposed body, mind, and spirit to a life independent of personal desire.²⁴ The regime established emotional conditioning that thwarted rational thought and used coercion, verbal and symbolic, to secure compliance most formatively before the age of thirteen.²⁵ The initial lure of the Nazi political and cultural agenda had radically shifted to a controlled economical and biological tribal agenda; what was first a love of Germany grew into a hatred of enemy tendencies.²⁶ School curriculums grew more explicitly racist to include ‘blood and soil’ propaganda of “racial teachings with scientific trimmings.”²⁷ National domination demanded individual subordination which meant exclusive youth loyalty to Hitler with fanatical national and ideological devotion, from voluntary submission to thought control.²⁸

Along with the destabilizing political dynamics, that aided Nazi control, came a history of tumultuous economic crises that intensified the vulnerability of Germany’s youth. As a unified Germany advanced with breathtaking speed to

¹⁸Maschmann, 11-12, 44.

¹⁹Felix Gilbert, “Revolution,” *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 4 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 164.

²⁰Maschmann, 17, 44.

²¹Kater, 11; Maschmann, 18, 44.

²²United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Indoctrinating Youth,” *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/indoctrinating-youth>.

²³Kater, 12-14.

²⁴Maschmann, 24.

²⁵David Easton and Robert D. Hess, “The Child’s Political World,” *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, no. 3 (1962) 236-240.

²⁶Kohn, 330; Maschmann, 26.

²⁷Maschmann, 48.

²⁸Krieger, 159-160.

become an industrial power by 1914, urban growth followed national wealth as enthusiastic Germans flocked into city centres at the beginning of WWI.²⁹ In the winter of 1918, sentiment radically shifted to despair as the post-war defeated populations were plagued with food and fuel shortages and a deadly influenza epidemic. Soldiers returned to cities stranded, jobless, hungry, and sullen. Germany, viewed as a pariah, was shackled by a bleak war guilt clause that imposed severe reparations and rooted a universal bitterness. Combined ramifications triggered hyperinflation and, by 1923, the German mark was destroyed. Economic collapse undermined the social fabric of Germany as lifetimes of savings were wiped out.³⁰ The cumulative effects caused a deep spiritual crisis as the results of the failed modern, industrial, capitalist framework caused a deep spiritual crisis that could not be stabilized by neither family nor religion.³¹ Financial enslavement through the terms of the long-term war reparations and erosion by exploitation of capitalism destroyed hope as suicide became a dark feature of Weimar Germany.³² In a void of solutions from authority figures, the youth demographic led an unprecedented suicide rate three times greater than the general public.³³ Exploiting this spiritual crisis as an entry point to attack the governing system, the Nazi's published victims' names and equated capitalism as "irreconcilable with human life."³⁴

After the economic havoc following WWI, a brief reprieve was followed by another disaster; the economic roller-coaster increasingly taxed a youth demographic that had grown ever more susceptible to false Nazi security. An easing of war reparations and sizeable loans from the US provided Germany relief, however, the market crash of 1929 triggered loan calls and economies fell like dominoes.³⁵ German deflation plunged the nation into another low while joblessness reached a pinnacle in the summer of 1932.³⁶ The situation was particularly perilous for the multitudes of children of war-widowed mothers and fatherless youths who suffered from malnutrition, inadequate shelter, illness, and death. As for fathers who survived, an ongoing failure to provide for their families heightened youth vulnerability.³⁷ Hitler preyed on every instability; projecting himself as an idealized father figure persona, he promised future employment to the German youth. In this

²⁹Leyser et al.

³⁰Leyser et al.

³¹Moritz Föllmer, "Suicide and Crisis in Weimar Berlin," *Central European History* 42, no. 2 (2009): 221.

³²Föllmer, 195-201.

³³Kater, 6.

³⁴Föllmer, 203.

³⁵Leyser et al.

³⁶George M. Katona, "How Real is the German Recovery?" *Foreign Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1934): 33.

³⁷Kater, 6.

atmosphere of uncertainty, many of the downtrodden were drawn to the authoritarian protector to allay their fears and anxieties.³⁸

In a political victory secured on the promise of recovery, Hitler infused false confidence to a beleaguered German populous and asserted himself as saviour of the 'Fatherland.' From the ashes of acute financial crisis in 1932, Germany rose in an unprecedented recovery.³⁹ A staggering rebound reduced six million unemployed to two and a half million in less than eighteen months of Nazi leadership. This perception was pivotal to Hitler. Lower unemployment numbers reduced benefits paid out and, coupled by increased marginal tax rates, the fiscal implications facilitated government access to capital including borrowing.⁴⁰ This new debt financed industry, presented a facade of growth, and provided the optics of stability key to a politically content population; the more prosperous the illusion, the easier this became.

While official unemployment reflected radical declines, reality was much more ambiguous.⁴¹ Recategorized as 'substitute employment,' about a million of the unemployed were mandated to perform 'voluntary' labour and received a reduced, meagre stipend. Another 300,000 employed workers, mostly women and youth, were discharged to 'substitute employment' as positions were filled by unemployed males.⁴² Receiving lowered benefits and a failure of meaningful opportunity many young workers were worse off in 1938 than after the crash in 1929, and lived in poverty with a stipend that failed to cover basic expenses.⁴³ Despite this, Hitler presented himself as saviour to Germany, and, as such, he branded youthful 'substitute' workers as 'followers' compelled to loyalty and duty.⁴⁴ Nazi 'Strength through Joy' campaigns granted mass tourism entitlements to workers aged fourteen and up in effort to mitigate grim conditions.⁴⁵ With scarce opportunity and a perception since childhood of the anarchy of industrial society, many young Germans saw military service as an option that offered security and a sense of nationalistic prestige.⁴⁶ As Hitler's spectacular economic recovery projected such intelligence, any inference of ineptness of policy, including aggression, was

³⁸Kater, 6-7.

³⁹Katona, 33; Guillebaud, 453.

⁴⁰Katona, 26-36.

⁴¹Katona, 37-37; Guillebaud, 455.

⁴²Katona, 27-28.

⁴³Otto Nathan, "Consumption in Germany during the Period of Rearmament," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 56, no. 3 (1942): 358; Maschmann, 27.

⁴⁴Spode Hasso, "Fordism, Mass Tourism and the Third Reich: The 'Strength through Joy' Seaside Resort as an Index Fossil," *Journal of Social History* 38, no. 1 (2004): 136.

⁴⁵Nathan, 358.

⁴⁶Koch, 19-20.

dismissed.⁴⁷ While Nazi economics hid a shell game of lies in an exploitive system, Hitler galvanized youth dedication to Nazi authority.⁴⁸

Just as political and economic conditions were catalysts to authoritarian control, Nazi ideology captured the historical heartbeat of youth culture. Modernity's myth of liberty floundered in the reality of industrialized society as Germany's youth was not freed, but chained to a dehumanizing machine of capitalism. Mass ills confounded urbanity and lent to growing anxiety. Family functioned in alignment with the drone of society; as parents achieved, so the young followed in the same narrow path in a patriarchal authority that commanded perpetual conformism. Politics became bureaucratic and irrelevant and art was insipid.⁴⁹ As the Enlightenment's secularism had widened with each generation, society reflected a lack of religious cohesion.⁵⁰ Once a template of moral and ethical grounding, the deeper meaning of Christianity became a rote tradition as an authoritarian and unimaginative canon turned any natural receptiveness towards religion into the opposite.⁵¹ Education composed of pedantic study failed to inspire. The working classes began a mundane factory life at fourteen while middle class youth, oppressed by the progress of modernity's repetition and keen to explore new ideas, congregated in youth group movements. Romantic notions of war, led to devastation; WWI slaughtered the once hawkish youth group members in a modern assembly line of death.⁵² Disillusionment left them ripe for the dogma of Nazi ideologies. Idealizing a break from intergenerational conflict and modernity's failed democratic capitalism, Hitler, disguised in patriarchal appeal as an "omniscient and omnipotent father," presented a model of society in a blurred resemblance to archaic values.⁵³ Here, youth culture became spiritually captive within 'the state,' the measure of all things. Escaping one paradigm, the young embraced the menacing danger of another; this one hidden under a facade of honour, admiration, and above all the love of the 'Fatherland.'⁵⁴

By exploiting ideological and cultural discontents of a disillusioned population, Hitler, as Führer, used his authority to control and mold the German youth in the false promise of a 'chosen' race. Propaganda flooded every village and emphasized Hitler's speeches, the re-creation of a German empire, and special subjects regarding 'racial science.'⁵⁵ Hitler reframed the cultural meaning of *Volksgeist* to

⁴⁷Maschmann, 59.

⁴⁸Hasso, 141.

⁴⁹Koch, 19-23.

⁵⁰Herbert Butterfield, "Christianity in History," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973): 407.

⁵¹Koch, 23; Maschmann, 24.

⁵²Koch, 2, 24.

⁵³Kater, 4-10.

⁵⁴Koch, 16-23; Maschmann, 73.

⁵⁵Nathan, 381-382; Guillebaud, 452; Maschmann, 51.

validate an ideology of a pure Aryan race determined by an organic or ancestral past that was unalterable into the future.⁵⁶ By 1939, over 765,000 young people served in leadership roles in Nazi organizations heavily concentrated in the military and special forces.⁵⁷ Bred for service to Germany, they were instructed, drilled, and trained with hard, tough, and swift efficiency.⁵⁸ This culture, subjugated by convention outside of family, had mobility, protection, and arrogant empowerment driven by a merciless ideology of the survival of the fittest.⁵⁹ Oaths of fealty to Adolf Hitler were reciprocated in the granting of authority to the HJ, who, with autonomy from parents and without culpability under law, possessed an “incomparable sense of superiority over average German citizens of any age, even when they were Nazis, and nearly absolute power over those who were not.”⁶⁰ Brainwashed to think, act, and fight with self-sacrifice and absolute obedience to Hitler until death, boys as young as their early teens were slaughtered in the last desperate months of 1945.⁶¹ The lessons of a demagogue in biological racism and superiority led them to carnage.⁶²

Drawing on political, economic, cultural and ideological cues, the Führer, with absolute authority, systematically misinformed, misguided, and misused Germany’s vulnerable youth population. Manipulating a group with a shared sense of identity, Hitler conformed young minds to Nazi control. Utilizing advantages including those born out of the ramifications of the aftermath of WWI, a series of economic crises, and a government ill-equipped to face the challenges of capitalism under duress, Hitler persuaded a democratic populous to embrace his authoritarian regime. Once in power, the Nazis ruled over the youth population indoctrinating various belief systems within school curriculums while mandating rigid youth group training. Hitler capitalized on an authoritarian control over the economy achieved by manipulation in its structuring and related propaganda. Economic uncertainty was sustained with underemployment. This presented an appeal to join the military as not only a viable economic security, but also, a recognizable transition from the rigorous training that had already been imposed in the formation of mandatory youth groups; this scheme provided a systematic conduit for many to the path of military recruitment. With an ingrained nationalistic hierarchy that replaced family and faith as beacons of authority, the Nazi regime provided a sense of power to the youth population. By alluding to a centuries-old sentiment in the connection of a shared language and culture, imposed propaganda gradually morphed the romantic philosophy into a belief of racial superiority rooted in the guise of science. By cultivating a sense of shared pride of heritage, Hitler drove

⁵⁶Kohn, 327.

⁵⁷United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

⁵⁸Maschmann, 26.

⁵⁹Koch, 26; Kater, 3-10.

⁶⁰Kater, 1-4.

⁶¹Koch, 2; United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

⁶²Kater, 2.

youth loyalty and systematically indoctrinated a sense of German destiny. His appeal was designed to alleviate a historically ambitious and accomplished citizenry desperate for relief having been deeply injured by the shame of failure. By controlling information and perpetuating propaganda, Hitler gained control over a large populous to ultimately destroy tens of millions of lives. As a cautionary tale, a reconstitution of this twentieth century debacle pivots around the misuse of information. Contemporary instances include disinformation directed towards latent thought control. This seemingly perennial problem of abuse of power is juxtaposed to democracy as a genuinely informed population is the basis of a free state. A broken information ecosystem, past or present, is a serious problem at the base of all others.

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THE SUCCESS OF THE GERMAN GREENS AND FAILURE OF THEIR AMERICAN COUSINS

KURTIS GREEN

This paper explores the varied reasons for the success of the Green Party in Germany and the continued failure of environmentally conscious parties in the United States. The explanations for these contrasting levels of success are found in their differing political cultures, opposing electoral systems, and the distinctive roles that interest groups play in each nation. Germany's political culture is clearly more welcoming to political parties outside the typical framework. The United States' two-party political system, unlike Germany's mixed-member proportional representation electoral system, results in a homogenization of political ideas, leaving little room for any third party. In contrast to Germany, the role that interest groups can play in America has made it virtually impossible for any kind of environmentally conscious political movement to gain traction at any level of government.

As science has continually predicted, the state of the Earth's environment will soon reach an inflection point from which there is no return. This reality takes up much of everyday life; whether it be the headlines we read, the way we handle our garbage, or the choices we make at the ballot box—it would be hard to argue that living with the reality of climate change is not a daily occurrence. Yet, despite the obvious role they play in the everyday, these issues are often not reflected at a governmental level, at least not in North America. It seems that North Americans are behind their European counterparts when it comes to ecological representation at government and policy levels. In their most recent election, the German Greens took an impressive 15% share of the 2021 vote, whereas in the United States it is difficult to find a party with environment-first priorities making much headway in any given election, no matter the level of some municipal gains.¹ So, this begs the

¹Paul Kirby, "Germany Elections: Centre-Left Claim Narrow Win over Merkel's Party," *BBC News*, September 27, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58698806>.

question, why is it that a Green party in Europe can galvanize such support, while environmentally conscious political parties struggle so much on the western side of the Atlantic? To answer this seemingly simple question, this paper will look at the case studies of the success of the German Green party against Green and other ecologically conscious parties in the United States that have found little to no success. The stark differences uncovered between the United States and Germany's institutions and culture reflect the former's inability to support an ecological party, while the latter allow for an environment-first party to thrive.

Germany's political culture often aligns with and has been welcoming to the Four Pillars of the Green Party (social justice, ecological wisdom, nonviolence, and grassroots democracy), which has been instrumental in the success of the Greens in Germany. We see an example of the Greens championing these pillars by their gendered policies that have elevated women in German politics for the last three or more decades.² By being at the forefront of feminism in a relatively inclusive culture, the Greens were able to attain recognition and would even go on to spearhead the change of the gendered landscape in German politics, a move that was soon followed by their political contemporaries.³ Although not quite as firm as in their 1980 inauguration, the Greens have also called for much less spending on the military and for funds to be used in social and welfare programs.⁴ This pacifism aligned not only with the relatively pacifist ideals of a new generation of socialists, but also appealed to many voters wary of Germany's authoritarian and militarist past. Furthermore, environmentalism in politics is not as foreign a concept to many Germans as it may be in the United States. The success of the Greens at all levels of government in the 1990s has normalized environmental politics for an entire generation of regularly voting German citizens, which has undoubtedly led to their continued success in the Bundestag.⁵ So, along with the normalizing of the Greens in government, one can see how they not only appeal to the concerns of environmental degradation, but to a dynamic number of socialist ideals that are held in high regard in German political culture.

American political culture has no place for an environmentally conscious party to succeed. Like their German contemporaries, the American Greens follow the same Four Pillars of the Green Party,⁶ which can largely be interpreted as having socialist influence—a notion that is not generally welcomed by the voting public in the

²Andrei S. Markovits, and Joseph Klaver, "Alive and Well into the Fourth Decade of Their Bundestag Presence: A Tally of the Greens' Impact on the Federal Republic of Germany's Political Life and Public Culture," *German Politics and Society* 33, no. 4 (2015): 121.

³Markovits and Klaver, 122.

⁴Emil Kwidziński, "German Green Party: The Evolution of Political Agenda," *Journal of Geography, Politics & Society* 10, no. 2 (April 2020): 49.

⁵Markovits and Klaver, 116.

⁶"Green Party US," The Green Party of the United States, <https://www.gp.org/>.

United States, at least not explicitly.⁷ This distrust has historical roots as American capitalists have often sought the elimination of socialism in American politics.⁸ This narrative still holds true today, as can be evidenced by the constant drumming up of fears of so-called big government socialists from the non-socialist American left.⁹ This may be a case of the American public being unaware of what socialism truly means, but many, especially those voters loyal to the American right, may see the Greens as part of a socialist cohort. This has resulted in the general American public being too wary of the perceived socialist notions that make up the Green Party. Furthermore, America's belief in the necessity and size of their military is almost religious, as can be shown by their unmatched military investment, and to not support the military would be very detrimental to any political movement.¹⁰ Of course, military spending would not align with the pillar of "nonviolence" which the Green Party maintains and would certainly result in the dilution of the American Green Party's political platform, further damaging their electoral chances. Finally, the notion of an ecologically friendly party is so far from being normalized in the American mind, let alone institutionalized, that the Greens were not even nationally registered until 2001.¹¹ Given this perception of the Greens as a fringe party, combined with American distrust of the socialist ideas represented by the Four Pillars of the Green Party, it is clear that the political culture of the United States is either not ready for, or willing to accept, any kind of ecologically minded party at any political level.

Germany's mixed member proportional representation (MMP) electoral system and multi-party system have allowed the Greens to flourish in the Bundestag. Essentially, the German MMP consists of two votes, the first as a direct vote in one's voting district, and the second as a vote from a party list.¹² The Bundestag is then aligned based on proportional voting, but for a party to be eligible to receive votes from the party list they need to galvanize at least five percent of the total vote to be represented. This system has allowed the Greens to gain many secondary votes and a place in the Bundestag. To help contextualize how this process is beneficial for the German Greens, one should look to their emergence as a viable ideology in the late 1960s and through the 1970s in Western Germany. During this

⁷James Broughel, "The Unlikely Story of American Regulatory Socialism," *Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics* 24, no. 1 (Spring 2021): 148.

⁸Rob Bryer, "Americanism and Financial Accounting Theory – Part 3: Adam Smith, the Rise and Fall of Socialism, and Irving Fisher's Theory of Accounting," *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 24, no. 7-8 (November 2013): 586.

⁹Peter Certo, "Who's Afraid of 'Socialism'?" *Institute for Policy Studies*, February 12, 2020. <https://ips-dc.org/whos-afraid-of-socialism/>.

¹⁰Max Roser, and Mohamed Nagdy, "Military Spending," *Our World in Data*, August 3, 2013, <https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending>.

¹¹Russel E. Cole, "Critical Cultural Analysis of a Midwestern State Green Party," *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences* 2, no. 2 (December 2010): 871.

¹²Alexander Fink, "The Effects of Party Campaign Spending under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Germany," *European Journal of Political Economy* 28, no. 4 (December 2012): 576.

time, amid student protests, the German people felt disillusioned and untrusting of their government after decades of tumultuous and horrific leadership, which allowed the Greens to position themselves as the “parliamentary wing of the protest movements.”¹³ In many other voting systems, the Greens would have found it difficult to find much support, but as the MMP system allowed voters to give so-called fringe parties a voice, they were able to find success at both the state and national level. Furthermore, this multi-party system allowed the Greens to take the next step to the federal stage in 1998 where they formed the first Red-Green coalition government with the Social Democrats that lasted almost a decade.¹⁴ Had it not been for the MMP electoral system, the Greens would have been pushed out by other larger parties. MMP representation has also allowed for greater diversity among parties in the Bundestag, as they were able to gather a substantial voting base and enter a coalition with the Social Democrats, thus propelling the Greens to national success and allowing them to become an eventual mainstay in the German political zeitgeist.

In stark contrast to Germany, the American electoral system leaves little room for any environmentally conscious parties to thrive. The complex voting system in the United States consists of elements of first-past-the-post and indirect popular vote. This more than two-hundred-year-old system only allows for two dominant parties to survive: the left-leaning Democrats and right-leaning Republicans. The first issue with having a two-party system is that the difference in philosophies can be marginal. As the former leader of the US Green Party Dr. Jill Stein points out, the difference is often moot and does not allow for much of a spectrum of ideas, which is of course in contrast to the Bundestag where six parties currently hold significant power as of 2021.¹⁵ This marginal difference between the parties ultimately results in a homogenization of ideas, so that parties which champion ideas outside the status quo would be seen as radical, such as the American Greens and their prioritization of the environment. Moreover, the first-past-the-post system in the United States leaves no room for another party, as voters feel inclined to vote for the lesser of two evils. This means that a citizen may not vote for the Green party as they may believe it to be a wasted vote, even if their personal political philosophy is more aligned with the more socialist Greens than with the non-socialist leftist Democrats. Unlike the German MMP system where voters have flexibility with their two votes, Americans often must vote strategically. We see an example of this fear when Dr. Stein discusses how political pundits blamed the success of the Greens in the 2002 election as taking away from a Democrat victory in Florida,

¹³Silke Mende, “‘Enemies at the Gate’: The West German Greens and Their Arrival at the Bundestag—Between Old Ideals and New Challenges,” *German Politics and Society* 33, no. 4 (2015): 69.

¹⁴Markovits and Klaver, 117.

¹⁵Michael Lerner, “Third-Party Politics: A Conversation Between Green Party Candidate Jill Stein and Michael Lerner,” *Tikkun* 27, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 53.

which would have changed the outcome.¹⁶ Although the 2002 electoral loss for the Greens was more complex than this, these fears likely persist in the mind of the American voter, and first-past-the post-voting reinforces a common belief that a vote for a third party is a wasted one. Therefore, the electoral college which favours a two-party system and the homogenizing of political philosophies leaves no space for a third party like the Greens to succeed or to present any ideas outside the collective political thought, as they would be considered too radical.

The structured role of interest groups in Germany has also played a vital role in allowing for the Green Party to succeed. Interest groups in Germany play an important and institutionalized role in policymaking. Unlike in the United States, German interest groups are institutionalized in a way that allows them to be somewhat regulated by the government, as the group itself will work in tandem with the government to create policy. This is notable as it gives interest groups a direct line of communication with the government. As global temperatures continue to climb, the calls for action against climate change are rising in Germany, and these interest groups can give the average citizen a voice.¹⁷ This is important for the Green Party as their interests, which often align with grassroots movements, can be expressed through policy that is created by the combined efforts of interest groups and policymakers. However, the most important aspect that makes Germany a more welcoming environment for the German Greens, while moving it even further away from the United States, is the cap placed on interest group spending. By contrast, the United States is an outlier among Western democracies concerning the amount of money that is disbursed by interest groups, and it is the conservative nature of the German approach to corporate interest spending that allows a grassroots party like the Greens to find electoral success. This is perhaps best contextualized by the glaring difference in campaign advertisements, as ad campaign spending in a German election cycle is minimal, partly due to its shorter election campaigns, which is more glaring when compared to the enormous spending on ad campaigns which Americans are accustomed to almost year-round.¹⁸ Again, this lack of spending on advertising would undoubtedly be beneficial to the Greens who tend to remove themselves from corporate spending.

Far removed from Germany, the power of interest groups in the United States is too great and overwhelming for an ecological party to succeed, especially at the grassroots level. Like Germany, interest groups play an important role in American society, but the playing field for interest groups is vastly different from Germany, as they are autonomous bodies from the government and there is no cap on spending

¹⁶Lerner, 53.

¹⁷Heike Klüver, "The Survival of Interest Groups: Evidence from Germany," *West European Politics* 43, no. 7 (November 2020): 1444.

¹⁸Jürgen Maier and Michaela Maier, "Audience Reactions to Negative Campaign Spots in the 2005 German National Elections: The Case of Two Ads Called 'The Ball'," *Human Communication* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 331.

by a third party following the *Citizens United vs the Federal Election Commission* decision by the Supreme Court. This means that if an interest group has enough capital, they can essentially spend as much money as they see fit to pressure or influence a campaign in a direction that aligns with their own interests. An example of this can be found at the state level in Massachusetts, which was one of the initial states set to be a leader of binding emissions targets.¹⁹ Yet, despite public support, these early efforts have either stalled or been eliminated at the behest of massive investment from fossil fuel lobbyists and interest groups.²⁰ This political outlook does not bode well for the Green Party, whose platform relies on grassroots support, which proves difficult when you consider the limits on spending that an individual can donate to a candidate committee is capped at under three thousand dollars per election.²¹ When considering the environmental direction the Greens wish to take the United States, it is also clear that they would certainly be at odds with the powerful, wealthy, and highly organized interest and pressure groups that are often funded by the fossil fuel industry and its beneficiaries. For the Green Party to find real traction with voters there would need to be an elimination of unlimited third-party spending. As Dr. Stein concedes in response to the argument that Rabbi Michael Lerner puts forth, the reality of interest groups holding too much sway in politics and policy will not change anytime soon, as “any legislation that seeks to limit the elites of money or corporate power will simply be overturned and declared unconstitutional.”²² Clearly, the power of these groups will not diminish unless the system itself changes, but considering how institutionalized these powerful groups are, it may be a long time until we see the American Green Party gain any real political success.

To conclude, Germany’s political institutions and culture allow for an ecologically driven party like the Greens to prosper, while the systems and culture present in the United States effectively suffocates any chance of an American Green party finding electoral traction. The differences are drastic between the two countries, as the German socialist values that often line their political culture are hospitable for the Four Pillars of the Green Party, while the dominance of capitalistic tendencies and distrust of socialism in the United States make the success of an American ecological party difficult. The institutions of both countries broaden this divide, with the German MMP representation allowing more diversity in political philosophy and the number of parties in the Bundestag, while the American electoral college essentially only maintains room for two parties that share a similar

¹⁹Trevor Cullhane, Galen Hall, and J. Timmons Roberts. “Who Delays Climate Action? Interest Groups and Coalitions in State Legislative Struggles in the United States,” *Energy Research & Social Science* 79 (September 2021): 1.

²⁰Cullhane, Hall, and Roberts, 1.

²¹“Contribution Limits,” Federal Election Commission, accessed November 13, 2021, <https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits/>.

²²Lerner, 71.

ideology. Finally, the systemic way in which interest groups coexist with government and actions groups in Germany allows the Greens a voice, whereas the power of big money in American interest groups cuts out that voice. Undoubtedly, there are advantages and disadvantages to each system and the answer as to which is better for the government will not be answered here, but what can be said is that as we approach the point of environmental disaster, it would be beneficial to all if we could give voice to those who are working tirelessly to combat this impending tragedy.

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CAN FIRST NATIONS SOVEREIGNTY COEXIST WITH CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY?

LOLA SQUARCI

In an era of greater awareness of Canada's history of colonization, the notion of sovereignty still seems unattainable for many First Nations. Is it possible for both Canada and First Nations to simultaneously have sovereignty? This paper explores the various concepts of sovereignty and examines the limitations and barriers for First Nations to achieve autonomy and self-governance. The starting point considers the various manifestations of sovereignty and identifying which version of sovereignty is most realistic for co-existing nations. The Indian Act has played a critical role in hampering self-governance negotiations between First Nations and the Government of Canada. Looking further at the factors that hinder First Nations sovereignty, including the federal government's historic, political, and systemic obstacles, this paper seeks to answer the question of whether or not First Nations sovereignty can coexist with Canadian sovereignty.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, discussions about First Nations sovereignty and self-government have become more frequent and less hypothetical. These discussions raise several important questions. One of the most important questions is whether First Nations sovereignty can coexist with Canadian sovereignty. This paper discusses the definitions and types of sovereignty considered in debates about First Nations rights, the changes that would need to be made for coexistence within a Canadian framework, and why these changes are unlikely to happen.

In order to understand why First Nations sovereignty cannot coexist within Canadian sovereignty, one must understand what sovereignty is. Sovereignty is defined as supreme power and is typically used in the context of who or what

controls a territory, region, or state.¹ There is also *de jure* sovereignty, which is the recognized right to control or govern a territory; and *de facto* sovereignty, which is whether the control over a territory exists.² Characteristics such as the degrees of exclusivity and absoluteness, are important when evaluating sovereignty. Exclusivity refers to whether a sovereign entity or political body can make policies, decisions, or laws without any of them being repudiated by a different authority.³ Absoluteness refers to how restricted a sovereign entity or political body's power is; the less restricted, the more sovereign.⁴ This is one of the reasons why First Nations sovereignty cannot fully coexist with Canadian sovereignty. The absoluteness of First Nations' power is restricted by Canadian federal laws and the exclusivity of their power is threatened by the federal government's ability to contradict their decisions. A sovereign power residing within a sovereign power is a paradox. Thus, true sovereignty may be impossible for First Nations within the existing framework of Canadian sovereignty; however, that does not rule out all forms of sovereignty.

The Canadian provinces have joint sovereignty; sovereign responsibilities are divided between provincial and federal governments.⁵ This is referred to as co-sovereignty.⁶ Because it is a practice that is already utilized in Canada, would it be possible for First Nations to have co-sovereignty? Co-sovereignty would be a more feasible way for First Nations to have sovereignty while coexisting with Canadian sovereignty. In fact, an argument could be made that First Nations living under the Indian Act already have co-sovereignty, it is just not identical to that of the provinces. The responsibilities of the provincial governments are more extensive than the responsibilities of First Nations band councils, and the provincial governments hold significantly more power than band councils do. However, many of the responsibilities of First Nations band councils are quite similar to those of the provincial governments. Some of the responsibilities that these two governing bodies have in common include jurisdiction over imposition of fines, health care, road regulations, and some natural resources if one considers fur bearing animals,

¹*A Dictionary of Law*, ed. Jonathan Law, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), s.v. "sovereignty,"

<https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198802525.001.0001/acref-9780198802525-e-3701?rsk=1KDnJ5&result=7>.

²*Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, s.vv. "de jure" and "de facto," accessed March 15, 2021, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/de%20jure>, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/de%20facto>.

³Kenneth Newton and Jan W. Van Deth, *Foundations of Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9.

⁴Jorge Emilio Núñez, "About the Impossibility of Absolute State Sovereignty," *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 27, no. 4 (October 2013): 648.

⁵*Constitution Act, 1867*, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (UK), ss. 91-95.

⁶*Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, s.v. "co-sovereignty," accessed March 15, 2021, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cosovereignty>.

fish, and other game to be natural resources.⁷ Bands councils have more responsibilities—and in theory, more control—than municipal governments, but their respective sovereignty is not equal to provincial sovereignty. There is no shared sovereignty between the federal government and band councils. Under the *Indian Act*, band council resolutions have no power or effect unless the resolution is approved by the minister of Crown–Indigenous relations.⁸ This condition means every decision a band council makes must be endorsed by a member of the federal government. The provincial governments do not have restrictions like this; they do not need approval from the federal government when making decisions about affairs that fall within their jurisdiction.⁹ As long as this restrictive condition remains in the *Indian Act*, co-sovereignty between band councils and the federal government will remain impossible.

At its most basic form, sovereignty is self-governance, and First Nations have the right to self-governance. In 1995, the federal government recognized the “inherent right of self-government as an existing right under section 35 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*.”¹⁰ This means negotiated self-government rights are constitutionally protected for First Nations, giving them de jure sovereignty. If this is the case, why do so many First Nations live under the *Indian Act* when legally they are entitled to negotiate self-government rights? One reason may be that negotiations often take a lot of time and resources, and many First Nations do not have the means to participate in them. Final land claim and self-government agreements can take anywhere between five to twenty years and can cost fifteen to fifty million dollars.¹¹ First Nations can borrow money from the government whom they are negotiating with to pay for negotiations, which is in itself a conflict of interest. Once a final agreement is reached, the debt is repaid using a portion of the settlement money that First Nations receive from the government as per their agreement.¹² That is of

⁷*Indian Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5, s. 81 (Can.); *Distribution of Legislative Powers*, Part 6 of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, s. 91-95 (Can.).

⁸*Indian Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5, s. 3 (Can.).

⁹*Distribution of Legislative Powers*, Part 6 of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, s. 91 (Can.).

¹⁰Government of Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, *The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government* (Hull, QC: Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010), <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1539869205136#inhrsg>.

¹¹Government of Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Resolving Aboriginal Claims - A Practical Guide to Canadian Experiences* (Ottawa, ON: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 2003), https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-CORP/STAGING/texte-text/rul_1100100014175_eng.pdf.

¹²Government of Canada, Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, *Renewing the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy: Towards a Framework for Addressing Section 35 Aboriginal Rights* (Ottawa, ON: Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2014), https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-TAG/STAGING/texte-text/ldc_ccl_renewing_land_claims_policy_2014_1408643594856_eng.pdf.

course, *if* a final agreement is reached. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada made a landmark decision in *Tsilhqot'in v British Columbia* and ruled that Aboriginal people hold title to their territorial lands and have the right to either benefit from development on that land or refuse development on that land.¹³ This ruling should have made it easier for other First Nations to negotiate land claims and self-governance with the federal government. However, shortly after the *Tsilhqot'in* ruling, the federal government released an updated comprehensive land claims policy.¹⁴ The renewed comprehensive land claims policy is problematic for a number of reasons. It prioritizes negotiating resource extraction, which is made evident by the passage: "Reconciliation promotes a secure climate for economic and resource development that can benefit all Canadians and balances Aboriginal rights with broader societal interests."¹⁵ Furthermore, it undermines First Nations sovereignty. The updated policy reiterates the original comprehensive land claims policy in stating that the government has the right to infringe upon or limit the rights of Aboriginal people as long as there is "a justification in accordance with the standards established by the Canadian courts."¹⁶ The original 1973 comprehensive land claims policy worked by negotiating First Nations land into private property that required First Nations to extinguish their Aboriginal title. The requirement of "extinguishment" was removed in 1986.¹⁷ Despite this change, the updated policy has a section labeled "certainty" which infers that it is another provision for discussing the surrender of land or extinguishment of titles. The new policy states: "the concept of certainty over lands and resources is central to the purpose of treaty negotiations, which provides a respectful framework for reconciliation."¹⁸ With negotiations taking decades and costing millions of dollars, and the possibility of having to sign away land rights in order to have self-government, it is not surprising that only four self-government agreements and eighteen comprehensive land claim agreements with self-government related provisions have been signed since 1973.¹⁹ The right to self-government is nothing more than an empty promise.

Even when First Nations spend millions on comprehensive land claim and self-government negotiations, there is no guarantee the government will respect the terms of the final agreement. The James Bay and Northern Quebec agreement was

¹³*Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia*, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).

¹⁴*Renewing the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy*.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹Government of Canada, Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs, *Implementation of Modern Treaties and Self-Government Agreements: July 2015 – March 2018 Provisional Annual Report* (Gatineau QC: Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs, 2019), https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-TAG/STAGING/texte-text/treaties-agreements_prov-annual-report-2015-2018_1573224351034_eng.pdf.

the first modern comprehensive land claim settlement as well as the first to be broken.²⁰ Many terms of the agreement, such as creating an economic development program that was supposed to include training and education, were not honoured.²¹ Another stipulation that was ignored by the federal government was giving Cree and Inuit people priority over hunting and tourist camps.²² It was only when the Cree and Inuit people of James Bay took the federal government to court that they received the benefits promised in the treaty.²³ Notwithstanding the winning court cases, many terms within the treaty continued to be disregarded.²⁴ In 1985, ten years after the comprehensive land claim agreement had been signed, Cree people brought to the federal government a list of sixty-five promises within the James Bay and Northern Quebec comprehensive land claim agreement that had not been honoured.²⁵ Since there is no treaty watchdog that keeps track of the government's violations of these agreements, it is difficult to know how many promises have been broken, how often they are broken, or how many First Nations have been affected. With no treaty watchdog, the only way to keep track of all the broken treaty promises is by monitoring the court cases that First Nations have brought against the federal government for not honouring their agreements. This is not an adequate way of recording the government's failure to comply with their agreements, as many First Nations do not have the means to take the government to court every time agreements are broken. The lack of oversight allows the federal government to continue to neglect their legally binding obligations to First Nations with self-government and land claim agreements. If the government continues to take no accountability, First Nations will continue to have no sovereignty.

For First Nations to have sovereignty or self-governance, many changes need to be made. *The Indian Act*, the comprehensive land claims policy, and likely many other government policies need to be altered or rewritten; however, that is unlikely to happen. The federal government has had decades to change their policies and laws in order to make the "right to self-government" possible or even slightly more attainable. In other words, the government is capable of resolving this issue, but it is simply not within its own best interest to do so. Supreme Court rulings in favour of First Nations and federal policy decisions that should benefit First Nations always seem to either be ignored by the federal government or contain loopholes that allow the government to continue to do what it has always done. Canada is often thought of as a forward thinking and progressive country, and perhaps it is in many ways, but it is still a country founded on colonialism. Although Canadians have become better at acknowledging Canada's colonial history, the country as a

²⁰Lisa Monchalin, *The Colonial Problem: An Indigenous Perspective on Crime and Injustice in Canada* (Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 239.

²¹Ibid, 242.

²²Ibid, 242.

²³Ibid, 242.

²⁴Ibid, 242.

²⁵Ibid, 242.

whole remains rife with colonial views and values. These colonial views and values are made obvious by Canada's focus on resource extraction, land development, and the fact that Canada's head of state is the Queen of Britain, the very kingdom that colonized Canada and countless other regions and territories. At the bare minimum, the federal government should respect its own laws and agreements, but it does not and that is a conscious choice. The concept of sovereignty itself is a materialistic and colonial one. To First Nations, controlling land is a responsibility that includes taking care of its people, animals, and resources.²⁶ To the government and many Euro-Canadians, controlling the land means owning the land. The land is seen as merely a means of economic opportunity and resources that can be exploited. The federal government with its colonial values cannot give sovereignty or self-government rights to people who will not let the government or corporations profit off of its resources. After centuries of working so hard to colonize this land, why would the Canadian government now give it back? First Nations sovereignty is unlikely to coexist with Canadian sovereignty since legislation seems poised to prevent it.

Laws, policies, power imbalances, financial barriers, general lack of oversight, and a fundamental difference in values. All these problems work together to prevent First Nations sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, most of these issues are caused directly by the federal government. First Nations sovereignty cannot coexist with Canadian sovereignty when the government is actively working to hinder it. Even when the federal government is at its most benevolent and allows a small fraction of First Nations to have self-government, it can still infringe upon the self-government rights, or simply choose not to fulfil its part of the agreement. Indigenous rights to sovereignty or self-governance will always be conditional. Therefore, the few First Nations who do have "self-government" are not sufficient examples of how First Nations sovereignty can coexist with Canadian sovereignty. Furthermore, if Indigenous self-government is truly a right, why does it need to be negotiated? It is not a right in truth, but a right in theory. It is a right that will never be anything more than hypothetical because it was never meant to be anything more than hypothetical. First Nations sovereignty cannot coexist with Canadian sovereignty because the only people who have the power to make it possible choose not to.

²⁶Jeff Cornassel, and Cheryl Bryce, "Practicing Sustainable Self-Determination: Indigenous Approaches to Cultural Restoration and Revitalization," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 18, no. 2 (2012): 151.

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